Reflection ciphers by Boura, Christina et al.
 
 
General rights 
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright 
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. 
 
 Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research. 
 You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain 
 You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal 
 
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately 
and investigate your claim. 
  
 
   
 
 
Downloaded from orbit.dtu.dk on: Mar 30, 2019
Reflection ciphers
Boura, Christina ; Canteaut, Anne; Knudsen, Lars Ramkilde; Leander, Gregor
Published in:
Designs, Codes and Cryptography
Link to article, DOI:
10.1007/s10623-015-0143-x
Publication date:
2017
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Link back to DTU Orbit
Citation (APA):
Boura, C., Canteaut, A., Knudsen, L. R., & Leander, G. (2017). Reflection ciphers. Designs, Codes and
Cryptography, 82, 3-25. DOI: 10.1007/s10623-015-0143-x
Reflection Ciphers (Extended abstract)
Christina Boura1,3, Anne Canteaut2,3, Lars R. Knudsen3, and Gregor
Leander4,3
1 Universite´ de Versailles Saint-Quentin, France
christina.boura@prism.uvsq.fr
2 Inria, France
anne.canteaut@inria.fr
3 DTU, Denmark
lrkn@dtu.dk
4 Ruhr-Universitt Bochum, Germany
gregor.leander@rub.de
Abstract. This paper investigates ciphers where the set of encryption
functions is identical to the set of decryption functions, which we call re-
flection ciphers. Equivalently, there exists a permutation P , named the
coupling permutation, such that decryption under k corresponds to en-
cryption under P (k). We show that this coupling permutation must be
an involution without fixed points. Special care has to be taken of some
related-key distinguishers since, in the context of reflection ciphers, they
may provide attacks in the single-key setting. We then derive some cri-
teria for constructing secure reflection ciphers and analyze the security
properties of different families of coupling permutations. In particular,
we show that, for affine coupling permutations, the resistance to related-
key distinguishers is given by some trade-off between the dimension and
the covering-radius of some linear codes. Finally, as an illustration, we
provide new variants of the block cipher PRINCE with key schedules
corresponding to several coupling permutations.
Keywords. Reflection ciphers, Involutions, Related-key distinguishers,
PRINCE.
1 Introduction
Among all design strategies used for reducing the implementation cost of a ci-
pher, one option consists in minimizing the overhead of decryption on top of
encryption. This feature was essential when encryption was performed by heavy
cipher machines since having two different machines, one for encryption and a
different one for decryption was unthinkable. This issue was then solved a century
ago by Arthur Scherbius who introduced a reflector into the Enigma machine,
that means an involutive transformation M which is applied to the initial per-
mutation and which is followed by the inverse permutation. Then, for any key,
the encryption function has the form Ek = F
−1 ◦M ◦ F , implying that it is an
involution. However, involutive ciphers present serious flaws, including the fact
that any involution can be easily distinguished from a randomly permutation by
the number of its fixed points. This type of weaknesses has been exploited for
cryptanalyzing Enigma. Instead, a classical solution consists in constructing a
cipher based on involutive building-blocks. For instance, the different round per-
mutations can be chosen within a family of involutions parameterized by a round
key, i.e., E(k1,...,kr) = Fkr ◦ . . . ◦Fk2 ◦Fk1 where all Fx are involutions. Then, the
decryption function under the round-key sequence (k1, . . . , kr) is equal to the
encryption function under the same round-key sequence but in reverse order,
i.e. Rev(k1, . . . , kr) = (kr, . . . , k1). Feistel ciphers with independent round-keys
are the most prominent examples of this construction [10]. But, since the round
key sequence is usually derived from a master key, i.e., (k1, . . . , kr) = KS(k), the
choice of the key expansion KS has a major influence both on the security and
on the implementation cost of the cipher. Indeed, KS should obviously be chosen
such that KS(k) does not provide any palindromic round-key sequence. Other-
wise, the cipher would have some weak keys under which the encryption is an
involution. Moreover, computing Rev(KS(k)) requires either the storage of the
whole round-key sequence, or the implementation of the reverse key expansion
function, like in the DES, for instance.
The implementation overhead due to the reverse key schedule can be avoided
by designing a cipher such that the family of decryption functions obtained for all
master keys is exactly the same as the family of all encryption functions. In other
words, for any master key k, there exists another key k′ such that decryption
with key k corresponds to encryption with k′. This has been used in [4] for
the block cipher PRINCE, more precisely for its core cipher PRINCEcore, where
k′ = k ⊕ α for some constant α. However, we could think of a more general
setting where there exists some permutation P of the key space such that, for
any key k,
(Ek)
−1
= EP (k) (1)
Such ciphers will be called reflection ciphers and the permutation P the coupling
permutation. As previously explained, reflection ciphers obviously include all
constructions with involutive round functions, like Feistel ciphers. RSA is also
a reflection cipher and in this case, the coupling permutation is secret: P is the
permutation of the set {x ∈ {2, . . . , (p−1)(q−1)−1} : gcd(x, (p−1)(q−1)) = 1}
corresponding to inversion modulo (p− 1)(q− 1), where p and q are two distinct
prime numbers.
Our Contribution. In this work we study the properties of reflection ciphers
and derive several universal conditions on how the coupling permutation P
should be constructed. We start by exhibiting very general properties, show-
ing for example that a coupling permutation should be an involution and that
fixed points should be avoided (cf. Section 2). Obviously, reflection ciphers are
not ideal in the related-key setting since the relation (Ek)
−1 = EP (k) allows
to easily distinguish them from an ideal cipher. We therefore explicitly exclude
related-key attacks here. However, an important observation is that some related-
key distinguishers may have a practical impact since they provide attacks in the
single-key model, in a scenario where an attacker has access to both the en-
cryption and the decryption operations. Therefore we study the influence of the
choice of P on such attacks, in particular on differential related-key distinguish-
ers. We elaborate on the trade-off between the size of (possibly weak) key classes
and the minimal Hamming weight of the difference P (k)⊕k introduced by com-
paring the encryption with the decryption process. We investigate different kinds
of coupling permutations such as affine permutations, including functions based
on bit permutations, nonlinear permutations and some combinations of those by
analyzing for each case the impact of related-key distinguishers (cf. Section 3).
We show in particular, that each family of functions can offer different trade-offs
between the two above quantities. In Section 4 we focus on key-alternating block
ciphers by emphasizing on ciphers with n-bit block size and 2n-bit key size. The
block cipher PRINCE [4] is an example of this family of ciphers. In the approach
followed by its designers, the key size is a priori limited to the block size, and
the solution chosen for doubling the key size is not optimal and raises security
questions [7]. We try here to answer this question by presenting some variants
that offer a better security, corresponding to different coupling permutations.
Because of the limited number of pages, most proofs are omitted in this
extended abstract.
2 General Criteria For the Coupling Mapping
In this section we derive criteria for the coupling mapping P . These criteria are
general and can be applied to different settings. For the rest of this paper, κ
denotes the key size and n the block size of the cipher. Therefore, the coupling
mapping is a function from Fκ2 into F
κ
2 .
2.1 Cycle structure of the coupling mapping
It is clear that Relation (1) makes sense only when the coupling mapping P is
a permutation: otherwise, there exists a subset of the key space which leads to
the same family of encryption functions. Moreover, Relation (1) implies that
Ek = EP 2i(k), ∀i ≥ 1,
for any key k. Then, if P is not an involution, several keys again lead to the same
encryption function, implying that the effective size of the key space is reduced.
Therefore, we focus on the case where P is an involution.
Fixed points of the coupling mapping. Fixed points of P correspond to weak
keys for the cipher, since the corresponding encryption functions are involutive.
Indeed, random involutions can be distinguished from random permutations by
using the fact that such involutions over Fκ2 have 2
κ
2 +O(1) fixed points, whereas
a randomly chosen permutation has O(1) fixed points [11, Page 596]. This weak-
ness is well-known and has been exhibited in several works, including [18]. It
is worth noticing that, in the particular case of an iterative construction of the
form Ek = F
−1 ◦M ◦ F , Ek has exactly the same number of fixed points as
the middle round M (and more general the exact same cycle structure). This
fact has been exploited for weak keys in DES where the middle round is the
swapping of the two halves, which has exactly 232 fixed points [6], and also in
Enigma where the reflector has no fixed points.
Fixed points of the coupling mapping also introduce weaknesses when E
is not used directly as an encryption function, but is modified by the FX-
construction [3, 15]. This construction (aka the Even-Mansour construction [8])
extends a block cipher E with a κ-bit key to a block cipher with a (κ+ 2n)-bit
key by XORing two n-bit secret whitening keys to the input and the output
of the cipher respectively. If the reflection cipher E is used as inner cipher in
the FX-construction, fixed points in the coupling mapping can be exploited by
the attacker to recover some information on the whitening keys (see Section 4.2
in [4]).
2.2 Affine coupling mappings
In this section, we focus on the case where P is an affine mapping, which is of
particular interest as affine functions permit efficient implementations. By ele-
mentary linear algebra, we obtain the following simple characterization of affine
involutions without fixed points. To avoid any ambiguity, we draw attention to
the fact that elements in Fκ2 are seen as row vectors, and that linear permutations
are written x 7→ xM for some matrix M .
Proposition 1. Let P be an affine function of Fκ2 . Then, P is an involution
without any fixed points if and only if φ : x 7→ P (x) + P (0) + x satisfies Imφ ⊂
Kerφ and P (0) belongs to Kerφ \ Imφ.
It is worth noticing that the condition Imφ ⊂ Kerφ implies that dim Kerφ >
κ/2. Also, the previous proposition recovers the result from [17, Lemma 1]: any
linear involution over Fκ2 has at least 2κ/2 fixed points, since we have proved that
P is a linear involution if and only if Imφ ⊆ Kerφ.
When L : x 7→ P (x) + P (0) corresponds to a bit permutation, we can derive
a very simple characterization of the mappings which satisfy the conditions of
the previous proposition.
Proposition 2. Let pi be a permutation of {1, . . . , κ} and M the corresponding
κ × κ permutation matrix. Then, there exists α such that x 7→ xM + α is an
involution without fixed points if and only if pi is an involution with at least one
fixed point.
In Section 4.2 of [4] the authors explain that the coupling mapping P (k1, k2)
= (k2, k1) + (α, α) should be avoided for any choice of the constant α. Indeed,
this mapping presents an obvious class of weak keys, that can be easily detected:
all keys (k1, k2) with k2 = k1 +α are fixed points of P . Then, the corresponding
encryption function is an involution. This unwanted behavior can now be ex-
plained by Proposition 2. Indeed, the bit permutation pi in the above coupling
mapping is only composed of cycles of length 2.
3 Impact of related-key distinguishers
The class of ciphers considered here has trivial related-key distinguishers. How-
ever, any class of related-key distinguishers for a reflection cipher involving both
Ek and its inverse, i.e., EP (k), provides a distinguisher in the single-key setting.
So, at least in scenarios where an attacker can be assumed to have access to both
the encryption and the decryption operations, the existence of some related-key
distinguisher must be investigated with care. There are at least two different
approaches (and a trade-off between both):
– The coupling mapping P can be designed in such a way that the relation
between k and P (k) is so complicated that any good related-key distinguisher
can only be exploited for a very small number of keys. For instance, if almost
all values k+P (k) differ when k varies, then any good related-key differential
distinguisher (involving keys which differ by a constant) defines very few
weak keys only.
– The coupling mapping P can be designed in a way that, for any k, a distin-
guisher involving both k and P (k) is unlikely to exist. For instance, choosing
P (x) = x + α as in [4], where α is a randomly chosen constant with a high
Hamming weight, follows this approach. One may expect that there are no
related-key distinguishers involving two keys with difference α, but, on the
other hand, if such a distinguisher exists, then all keys will be weak.
3.1 Related-key differential distinguishers
It is well-known that a given block cipher cannot be secure against all types
of related-key distinguishers. Indeed, there exist some sets of related-key deriva-
tion functions which allow to build a distinguisher with overwhelming advantage
for any cipher [2, 13, 1]. Here, we focus on the set of additions with a constant,
which is one of the most relevant and sound families of related-key derivation
functions [2]. In other words, we investigate the existence of related-key distin-
guishers involving keys k and k′ = k + δ.
In this context, the mapping φ : x 7→ P (x) + x + P (0) and the set Im(φ) =
{x+P (x) +P (0), x ∈ Fκ2} play an important role. Let N denote the size of this
set. We have N ≤ 2κ−1 since both x and P (x) have the same image under φ
and are distinct because P has no fixed points. Then, φ defines an equivalence
relation on the keys, namely the key space is partitioned into N equivalence
classes Kδ := {k : k + P (k) = δ}. Each of these classes corresponds to a
potential class of weak keys that may result from the existence of a related-key
distinguisher involving keys k and k′ = k + δ. All these key classes have size at
least 2, and their average size is 2κ/N .
So, there is a trade-off between two quantities: the maximal size of a key class
Kδ and the minimum weight of the set {δ : Kδ 6= ∅}. In the following, the relation
between these two quantities is investigated from a theoretical point of view, first
when P has degree 1, and then for some particular nonlinear mappings. Later, in
Section 4, some concrete constructions of key-alternating reflection ciphers will
be presented in which the minimum weight of {δ : Kδ 6= ∅} affects the existence
of efficient related-key distinguishers.
3.2 When P is affine
When P has degree 1, all non-empty key classes Kδ are affine subspaces of Fκ2 of
the same dimension p, since they are all cosets of Kerφ. Therefore, the minimal
possible dimension for the key classes is (κ + 1)/2 (see Prop. 1). Moreover, the
second quantity, the minimum weight of {x + P (x)} = P (0) + Imφ is equal to
the Hamming distance between P (0) and Imφ, where P (0) 6∈ Imφ. The highest
possible value for dH(P (0), Imφ) then corresponds to the covering radius of Imφ,
which is a linear code of length κ and dimension (κ− p). And, it is well-known
that the covering radius of a linear code of length κ and dimension (κ− p) does
not exceed κ− (κ− p) = p, see for example Proposition 2 in [5]. We then deduce
the following result.
Proposition 3. Let P be an affine involution over Fκ2 without fixed points. Let
p denote the dimension of the non-empty sets Kδ = {x : x+ P (x) = δ}. Then,
p > κ/2, and
min
x∈Fκ2
wt(x+ P (x)) ≤ p .
Moreover, the affine involutions for which the previous upper-bound is tight
can be characterized.
Proposition 4. Let κ and p be two integers, κ < 2p. The permutation P is an
affine involution over Fκ2 such that
min
x∈Fκ2
wt(x+ P (x)) = p and dim{x : x+ P (x) = δ} = p, ∀δ ∈ Im(P + Id)
if and only if, up to a permutation of the coordinates of x and of P (x),
P (x) = x+ xM + P (0) with M =
ZB ZBZ 0B BZ 0
C CZ 0

where Z is a (κ− p)× t matrix, 0 ≤ t ≤ κ− p, having t distinct nonzero rows,
all of weight 1, B is a t × (κ − p) matrix, C is a (p − t) × (κ − p) matrix such
that rankM = κ − p, 1B + 1C = 0 and P (0) = (u, Zu,1) with u ∈ Fκ−p2 , and
1 denotes the all-one word.
Example 1. Let κ and p be two integers with p > κ/2. We consider the mappings
defined in the previous proposition with parameter t = 0. Then, we have
M =
(
0 0
C 0
)
where C is a p× (κ− p) matrix of full rank and with columns of even Hamming
weight (i.e., 1C = 0). Let γi be the i-th column of C. Then, up to a permutation
of the coordinates of x and z, P is defined by P (x1, . . . , xκ) = (z1, . . . , zκ) with
zi =
{
xi + γi · (xκ−p+1, . . . , xκ) + αi for 1 ≤ i ≤ κ− p
xi + 1 for κ− p < i ≤ κ ,
where αi ∈ F2 for 1 ≤ i ≤ κ − p. It can be checked that, for any linearly
independent vectors γi ∈ Fp2, 1 ≤ i ≤ κ − p, of even Hamming weight, this
mapping is an involution, that all non-empty sets {x : x + P (x) = δ} have
dimension p and all elements x+ P (x) have Hamming weight at least p.
Coupling mappings based on bit permutations. In the particular case
where the coupling mapping is defined by P (k) = kM +α, where M is a permu-
tation matrix, we can show that the bound of Prop. 3 is not tight. However, we
can precisely determine the minimal (and maximal) weight of {k+P (k), k ∈ Fκ2}.
Proposition 5. Let pi be an involution of {1, . . . , κ} with f ≥ 1 fixed points and
M the corresponding κ× κ permutation matrix. Let α ∈ Ker(M + Id). Then,
∀k ∈ Fκ2 , wt(αFP ) ≤ wt(k + kM + α) ≤ κ− f + wt(αFP )
where αFP denotes the f -bit binary word equal to the restriction of α to the
coordinates corresponding to the fixed points of pi.
Then, when k 7→ kM is a bit permutation with f ≥ 1 fixed points, all key
classes have size 2
κ+f
2 , and the minimum weight of k + kM + α is equal to
wt(αFP ) ≤ f . Therefore, the bound of Proposition 3 is not tight (except when
pi = Id and α = 1): the optimal trade-off between the two quantities cannot be
achieved by bit permutations. However, the values of the two quantities obtained
for some bit permutations may be considered as reasonable when a lightweight
coupling mapping is required.
3.3 When P is nonlinear
If we want to reduce the size of all key classes to guarantee that any related-key
distinguisher defines a very few weak keys only, we need to choose a nonlinear
coupling mapping since the key classes for an affine coupling mapping have
size at least 2
κ+1
2 . We then study the trade-offs between the maximal size of
a key class and the minimal weight of (k + P (k)) achieved by some particular
families of nonlinear coupling mappings. As we will see, some of these mappings
are of theoretical interest only since their implementation cost is too high for
a practical use within a lightweight block cipher. However, investigating non-
linear permutations permits to obtain a better idea of the bounds that can be
in general achieved by coupling permutations.
Inverse mapping. The inverse mapping over the field with 2κ elements pro-
vides a nice example of an involution where the size of the key classes is minimal.
However, it has two fixed points (0 and 1) which must be excluded.
Proposition 6. Let ψ be any isomorphism from F2κ into Fκ2 , and x0 = ψ(1).
Let P be the permutation of Fκ2 defined by
P (x) = ψ
[(
ψ−1(x)
)2κ−2]
.
Then, P is an involution without fixed points over Fκ2 \{0, x0}, and for any δ,
the set Kδ = {x : x+P (x) = δ} has size either 0 or 2. Moreover, for any κ ≥ 5,
there exists some ψ such that
min
x6=0,x0
wt(x+ P (x)) ≥ 2 .
Proof. P is an involution since (2κ − 2)2 ≡ 1 mod (2κ − 1) (i.e., the inverse
function is an involution). Moreover, any nonzero fixed point x of P should be
such that y = ψ−1(x) satisfies y2
κ−2 = y which is equivalent to y2 = 1. This
equation does not have any solution when y 6∈ F2 (i.e., when x 6∈ {0, x0}).
Similarly, any nonzero element x in the key class Kδ = {x : x + P (x) = δ}
should be such that y = ψ−1(x) satisfies
y + y2
κ−2 = ψ−1(δ) .
Since y 6= 0, this is equivalent to y2 + δ′y + 1 = 0 where δ′ = ψ−1(δ). Moreover,
δ′ is nonzero because the class {x : x+P (x) = 0} is equal to {0, x0}. Then, this
quadratic equation has 2 solutions if Tr(δ′−1) = 0, and no solution otherwise. It
follows that the minimal weight of x+P (x) when x ∈ Fκ2 \{0, x0} corresponds to
the minimum weight of δ 6= 0 such that Tr([ψ−1(δ)]−1) = 0. Then, we have that
this minimum weight is at least 2 if and only if all vectors x ∈ Fκ2 of weight 1
are such that Tr(
[
ψ−1(x)
]−1
) = 1. An equivalent condition is that there exists a
basis {b1, . . . , bκ} of F2κ such that Tr(b−1i ) = 1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ κ. In particular, if
{b1, . . . , bκ} is a normal basis, i.e., bi = b2i−1 , then Tr(b−1i ) takes the same value
for all elements in the basis. Therefore, any normal basis {b, . . . , b2κ−1} of F2κ
such that Tr(b−1) = 1 leads to an isomorphism ψ for which the minimal weight
of x+ P (x) is at least two.
For any element α ∈ F∗2κ , Tr(α) is the sum of all conjugates of α. Since the
minimal polynomial mα of α is the product of all (X−α2i), it is clear that Tr(α)
is the coefficient of the monomial of degree (deg(mα)− 1) in mα. Moreover, the
minimal polynomial of α−1 is the reciprocal of the minimal polynomial of α.
We then deduce that Tr(α−1) is the coefficient of the monomial of degree 1 in
mα. The existence of a normal basis satisfying the requirements is equivalent to
the existence of a normal element b in F2κ such that the coefficient of degree 1
of its minimal polynomial is equal to 1. It has been proved in [9] (see also [14,
Theorem 2.20]) that such an element always exists for κ ≥ 5. uunionsq
A general construction. Another technique consists in constructing an appro-
priate nonlinear involution by P = S ◦M ◦ S−1 where M is an affine involution
without fixed points as described in the previous section, and S is a nonlinear
permutation with good differential properties. More precisely, we focus on the
differential uniformity of S, which is the maximal number of solutions x ∈ Fκ2
for an equation S(x+ a) + S(x) = b, a, b ∈ Fκ2 and a 6= 0 [16].
Proposition 7. Let M be an affine involution of Fκ2 without fixed points with
dim Im(M + Id) = p. Let S be a permutation of Fκ2 with differential uniformity
δ(S). Then, P = S ◦M ◦ S−1 is an involution without fixed points and satisfies
max
δ∈Fκ2
#{x : x+ P (x) = δ} ≤ 2pδ(S)
and
min
x∈Fκ2
wt(x+ P (x)) ≥ min
{
wt(x), x ∈
⋃
a∈Im(M+Id)
Im(DaS)
}
,
where DaS : x 7→ S(x+ a) + S(x).
Most notably, if M(x) = x+ α for some α ∈ Fκ2 \{0}, we have
max
δ∈Fκ2
#{x : x+P (x) = δ} ≤ δ(S) and min
x∈Fκ2
wt(x+P (x)) ≥ min{wt(x), x ∈ Im(DαS)} .
Proof. It is clear that P is an involution without fixed points if and only ifM is an
involution without fixed points. Moreover, there is a one-to-one correspondence
between both sets {x : x + P (x) = δ} and {y : S(y) + S ◦M(y) = δ}. The set
{y : S(y) + S ◦M(y) = δ} is included within the set⋃
a∈Fκ2
{
y : (M + Id)(y) = a and S(y) + S(y + a) = δ
}
.
Then, we directly deduce the bounds on the cardinality of {y : S(y)+S◦M(y) =
δ}, and on the minimal weight of (S(y) + S ◦M(y)). uunionsq
Example 2. We choose
S(x) = ψ
[(
ψ−1(x)
)2κ−2]
where ψ is the isomorphism from F2κ into Fκ2 defined by a normal basis {a, a2, . . . ,
a2
κ−1} with Tr(a−1) = 1. Such a basis exists for any κ ≥ 5 as detailed in the
proof of Proposition 6. For x0 = ψ(1),
P (x) = S (S(x) + x0)
is an involution over Fκ2 without fixed points and satisfies
max
δ∈Fκ2
#{x : x+ P (x) = δ} =
{
2 if κ is odd
4 if κ is even
and min
x∈Fκ2
wt(x+ P (x)) ≥ 2 .
The fact that P is an involution without fixed points and the maximal size of
a key class are derived from the previous proposition, since the inverse function
over F2κ is differentially 2-uniform (resp. 4-uniform) if κ is odd (resp. even) [16].
Moreover, this bound is tight since there is a one-to-one correspondence between
the elements in {x : x+P (x) = x0} and the solutions z of (z+1)2κ−2+z2κ−2 = 1.
The number of solutions of this last equation is 2 if κ is odd and 4 if κ is even.
Also, the minimal weight of (x+P (x)) is the minimal weight of any element
in the image set of the derivative Dx0S. Then, it corresponds to the minimal
weight of ψ(y) for y ∈ {(z + 1)2κ−2 + z2κ−2, z ∈ F2κ}. By using the same
technique as in the proof of Proposition 6, we get that
{(z + 1)2κ−2 + z2κ−2} = {x ∈ F2κ : Tr(x−1) = 0} .
By definition of ψ, the elements δ of weight 1 in Fκ2 satisfy y = ψ−1(δ) = a2
i
for some 0 ≤ i ≤ κ− 1, implying that Tr(y−1) = Tr(a−1) = 1. Therefore, these
elements y = ψ−1(δ) do not belong to {(z + 1)2κ−2 + z2κ−2, z ∈ F2κ}, which
equivalently means that the elements δ of weight 1 do not belong to the image
set of the derivative Dx0S.
4 Some variants of PRINCE
We will see now how the coupling permutations investigated in the previous
section can be used for constructing some variants of the block cipher PRINCE.
Indeed, the design of PRINCE raised several questions. One such question is
related to the key size of the cipher. In particular, the coupling mapping chosen
in PRINCE limits the key size to the block size, which is too small in most
lightweight ciphers. The approach used in PRINCE for doubling the key length
consists in using a whitening key which is independent from the key of the inner
cipher. However, this solution is not satisfactory because the resulting security
level does not correspond to what is usually expected from the key size [7]. We
then analyze alternative solutions for constructing a key-alternating reflection
cipher whose key is twice as long as the block size.
Recall that the structure used in PRINCE is as follows: the cipher is com-
posed of a number of round permutations, R1, . . . , Rr (and their inverses) along
with an unkeyed involution M in the middle of the structure. Now, we con-
struct coupling permutations for reflection ciphers following this structure for
the special situation of an n-bit block cipher with a 2n-bit key.
Construction 1. We split the 2n-bit master key into two halves k = (k0, k1)
and use as a coupling mapping the permutation
P (k0, k1) = (F0(k0, k1), F1(k0, k1)) .
In other words, F0 and F1 denote the restrictions of P to the first and second
half of the output respectively. Then, we define the subkeys as follows:
R1m R2
k1
Rr M R
−1
r R
−1
2 R
−1
1 c
k0k0 k1 F1(k0, k1) F0(k0, k1) F0(k0, k1)F1(k0, k1)
Fig. 1. Construction 1: a reflection cipher with 2n-bit key and n-bit block with coupling
mapping P (k0, k1) = (F0(k0, k1), F1(k0, k1)).
– for 0 ≤ i ≤ r, ki = k0 if i is even and ki = k1 if i is odd;
– for r + 1 ≤ i ≤ 2r + 1, ki = F1(k) if i is even and ki = F0(k) if i is odd.
An important security parameter of this construction is the number of infor-
mation bits corresponding to the first and the last-round keys: this is the number
of key bits which need to be guessed in order to peel off one round at both ends.
Then, a strategy for attacking the (2r+ 1)-round cipher consists in guessing the
first and last round keys and in attacking the (2r − 1) middle rounds in order
to recover the remaining key bits. Therefore, if the amount of key guessing cor-
responding to the extremal rounds is much smaller than the overall key size, we
must ensure that attacking (2r−1) rounds is infeasible. Such a situation usually
imposes to increase the number of rounds compared to the n-bit key variant,
which is highly unsuitable in the context of unrolled implementations, for in-
stance for low-latency ciphers. An example of such a situation is the lightweight
cipher LED-128 for which the first and last round keys are similar and cover half
of the key size. For this reason, LED-128 has 16 more rounds (i.e., four steps)
than its 64-bit variant, as explained by the designers [12, Section 3.1].
We need therefore to determine the number of different values of the pair
(k0, F0(k0, k1)), when the vector (k0, k1) takes all the possible 2
2n values. This
number corresponds to ∑
k0∈Fn2
# Im(F0(k0, .))
where F0(k0, .) is the mapping k1 7→ F0(k0, k1). In particular, the amount of
key-guessing for this pair of subkeys is maximal and equals to 2n bits if and only
if k1 7→ F0(k0, k1) is a permutation of Fn2 for every possible k0 ∈ Fn2 . At the other
extreme, the amount of key-guessing is only n bits if and only if F0 is indepen-
dent from k1. This situation occurs for instance when the coupling mapping P
operates on the two halves of its input separately: P (k0, k1) = (P0(k0), P1(k1)),
where P0 and P1 are two permutations of Fn2 .
Construction 2. If P (k0, k1) = (P0(k0), P1(k1)), the amount of key-guessing
for the first and last round keys corresponds to n bits only. But, the previous
construction can be slightly modified in order to increase this number: the first
subkey is replaced by (k0 + k1) and the last one is now replaced by (P0(k0) +
P1(k1)), as depicted below.
R1m R2
k1
Rr M R
−1
r R
−1
2 R
−1
1 c
k0k0 ⊕ k1 k1 P1(k1) P0(k0)⊕ P1(k1)P0(k0) P1(k1)
Fig. 2. Construction 2: a reflection cipher with 2n-bit key and n-bit block with coupling
mapping P (k0, k1) = (P0(k0), P1(k1)).
Then, we can prove that this second construction increases the amount of
key-guessing, which is strictly greater than n bits in the following two cases: if
P0 = P1 and P0 is nonlinear, or if P0 and P1 are two distinct affine permutations.
This is detailed in the following two propositions.
Proposition 8. Let P0 be an involution of Fn2 . Then, the number of different
values of the pair (k0 + k1, P0(k0) + P0(k1)), when (k0, k1) takes all the possible
22n values is ∑
a∈Fn2
# Im(DaP0) ,
where DaP0 : x 7→ P0(x+ a) + P0(x). This number is strictly greater than 2n if
and only if degP0 > 1.
Proof. Let a = k0 + k1. Then, we need to determine the number of different
values of (a, P0(k1 +a)+P0(k1)) = (a,DaP0(k1)) where (a, k1) takes all possible
values in F2n2 . For each a ∈ Fn2 , the number of values taken by DaP0(k1) when
k1 varies is the cardinality of the image set of DaP0. Moreover, this number
equals 2n if and only if each DaP0 is a constant function. It is well-known that a
function having all its derivatives constant is a function of degree at most 1. uunionsq
When both P0 and P1 are affine but distinct, the amount of key-guessing is
given by the following proposition.
Proposition 9. Let P0 and P1 be two affine involutions of Fn2 . Then, the number
of different values of the pair (k0 + k1, P0(k0) + P1(k1)), when (k0, k1) takes all
the possible 22n values is 2n+ν where
ν = rank(P0 ◦ P1 + Id) = rank(P0 + P1) .
Proof. Obviously, the number of different values of the quantity (k0+k1, P0(k0)+
P1(k1)) is equal to the number of different values of its linear part, that is of
(k0 + k1, L0(k0) + L1(k1)) where Li(x) = Pi(x) + Pi(0). Let a = k0 + k1. The
previous couple can then be written as (a, L0(a + k1) + L1(k1)) = (a, L0(a) +
(L0 + L1)(k1)). The number of values taken by this pair then corresponds to
2n+ν where ν = rank(P0 + P1). Equivalently, it corresponds to the rank of
k1 7→ P0(P0(k1) + P1(k1)) = k1 + P0(P1(k1)) .
uunionsq
We now consider the particular case where the linear parts of P0 and P1
are defined by two bit permutations pi0 and pi1. In order to guarantee that P is
an involution, we need pi0 and pi1 to be involutions (cf. Corollary 2). Then, the
amount of key-guessing is related to the number of fixed points of pi0 and of pi1,
as stated in the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Let pi0 and pi1 be two involutions of {1, . . . , n} and L0 and L1 be
the corresponding permutations of Fn2 . Then, the rank of L0 ◦ L1 + Id is upper
bounded by n− (f0 + f1)/2 where fi is the number of fixed points of pii.
Thus, in order to ensure a high cost for guessing the first and the last round
keys, the number of fixed points of pi0 and of pi1 has to be minimal. However,
given Proposition 5, this comes at the price that (k + P (k)) may have a low
Hamming weight.
Based on the previous results, we can then define some variants of PRINCE
which differ from their key schedule only. All these variants operate on 64-bit in-
puts with a 128-bit key, and follow Construction 2 with 5 rounds Ri, 1 ≤ i ≤ 5,
an unkeyed middle round M , and then the inverses of the five Ri (see Fig-
ures 1 and 2). We define three different coupling mappings: a nonlinear per-
mutation of the form P (k0, k1) = (P0(k0), P0(k1)) where P0 is defined by the
construction presented in Section 3.3; an affine coupling mapping of the form
P (k0, k1) = (P0(k0), P1(k1)) where both affine involutions P0 and P1 are ob-
tained as in Example 1 in Section 3; a coupling mapping based on a bit permu-
tation. The respective properties of these three key-schedules are given in Ta-
ble 1. The variant with the nonlinear key schedule has much smaller key classes
but this variant is not realistic when a low-cost implementation is required. The
two other key schedules can be implemented with very few resources since they
correspond to very sparse affine permutations over F642 . In particular, the key
schedule based on bit permutations appears to be very efficient. These two key
schedules then provide interesting variants of PRINCE at a marginal implemen-
tation overhead. In particular, their security level is not limited by the generic
attack against the FX-construction.
Table 1. Summary of the studied quantities for the proposed alternative key-schedules.
PRINCE nonlinear affine (p = 33) bit permutation
key-guessing 128 119.9 126 112
max size of Kδ 2128 232 266 280
minimum number of active Sboxes ≥ 24 ≥ 72 ≥ 48
5 Conclusion
In this work, we tried to answer some open questions related to the design of a
family of ciphers, for which the set of encryption functions is identical to the set
of decryption functions. In particular, we focused on the design of what we called
the coupling permutation. A coupling permutation P applied to a master key
k, makes, in our context, encryption with P (k) identical to decryption with k.
Questions on the design of the coupling permutation of reflection block ciphers
were raised after the design of the lightweight block cipher PRINCE. Indeed, in
PRINCE, the coupling permutation chosen by the designers doesn’t seem optimal
and its impact on the cipher’s security is questioned. After presenting some gen-
eral properties of coupling permutations, we analyzed the case of PRINCE and
came up with some alternative key schedules for this cipher. Each key schedule
presents a different trade-off of the studied security properties and the choice of
which one to choose should depend on the security requirements settled by the
designers and the target implementation cost.
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